Inapplicability of Differential Fault Attacks Against Cellular Automata Based Lightweight Authenticated Cipher
Ambili K. N. and Jimmy Jose
Authenticated encryption (AE) schemes are a necessity to secure the physical devices connected to the Internet. Two AE schemes, Tiny- Jambu and Elephant, are finalists of NIST lightweight cryptography competition. Another AE scheme, ACORN v3, a CAESAR competition finalist, has been shown to be particularly vulnerable against Differential Fault Attack (DFA), even more than its previous version ACORN v2. TinyJambu is also susceptible to DFA. An optimized interpolation attack has been proposed against one instance of Elephant, Delirium, recently. We propose methods to strengthen these schemes using the Cellular Automata (CA) and increase their resistance to these attacks. The Programmable Cellular Automata (PCA) 90-150 is effectively deployed to make these ciphers robust against DFA. We also provide mathematical analysis of the invigorated schemes and show that significant improvement is achieved in all the three enhanced schemes.
Keywords: ACORN, TinyJambu, differential fault attack, optimized interpolation attack, cellular automata, PCA 90-150, authenticated encryption